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Abstract
This study builds a dynamic balance-of-payments-constrained (BOPC) model that incor-
porates the endogenous determination of the economic growth rate, conflictive wage/price
distribution, and employment rate. Following the Kaleckian–Marxian literature, wages and
commodity prices are determined by the reserve army eect and employment is determined
by the reserve army creation eect. The relative strength of these two eects generates dif-
ferent outcomes for the transitional dynamics and comparative statics analysis. In particular,
the model shows stability, instability, and a cyclical nature, the latter of concurs with the
evidence reported by previous empirical studies.
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1 Introduction
This study presents a dynamic balance-of-payments-constrained (BOPC) growth model that has
three dierences from the conventional BOPC growth model, namely the dynamic determination
of the (i) BOPC growth rate, (ii) conflictive wage/price distribution, and (iii) employment rate.
The BOPC growth model is a growth theory in post-Keynesian economics. The model postulates
that the balance-of-payments position of a country limits eective demand, to which supply can
usually adapt. That is, BOPC growth serves as an upper bound on the actual growth rate. Nu-
merous contributions have been made since the seminal work of Thirlwall (1979). Soukiazis and
Cerqueira (2012) comprehensively summarize recent contributions on the history, theory, and
empirical evidence of BOPC growth. Theoretical research covers many topics such as incorpo-
rating capital flows and interest payments (Thirlwall and Hussain (1982); Moreno-Brid (2003);
Barbosa-Filho (2001); Alleyne and Francis (2008)), a multi-sectoral model with many tradable
goods (Araujo and Lima (2007); Araujo (2013); Araujo et al. (2013)), and an integral approach
to internal and external imbalances (Soukiazis et al. (2013-2014, 2014)).
However, as these studies have focused on the equilibrium path of the economy, the nature of
transitional dynamics has thus far remained ambiguous. In addition, most models have formal-
ized the BOPC growth model in terms of international trade. Consequently, they have overlooked
the eects of the income distribution and employment on trade competitiveness. Indeed, although
the causes and consequences of employment and income distribution dynamics are relevant re-
search topics in post-Keynesian economics, their impacts on BOPC growth have not yet been
examined.
In this vein, the present study addresses the following three points. First, most BOPC growth
models analyse economic growth on the equilibrium path. Their analysis is thus limited to the
steady-state path, and the transitional dynamics towards the long-run path are not investigated. In
other words, existing models by nature exclude the situation when a gap between the growth rates
of exports and imports exists. Given the trade imbalance in the real world, it is empirically unre-
alistic to suppose that this is the case. The BOPC growth model should theoretically investigate
not only the on-path process but also the o-path process caused by balance-of-payments dise-
quilibria, which motivates the current study to consider the transitional dynamics in the BOPC
growth model. Such an extension reveals the potential instability involved in the standard BOPC
growth model.
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Second, the BOPC growth model generally assumes away the eects of relative prices or the
real exchange rate in deriving the long-run growth rate, and then derives Thirlwall’s law. These
eects are supposed to be neutral on economic growth, either because the price elasticities of
exports and imports are assumed to be low or because the evolution of the exchange rate tends
to follow purchasing power parity (PPP) in the long run. Consequently, the interrelationship be-
tween the determinants of relative prices and BOPC growth remains unexplored in the literature.
The evolutions of nominal exchange and inflation follow dierent mechanisms. For example,
inflation is, according to post-Keynesian economics, an outcome of the class conflict over the
income distribution in the economy (Rowthorn (1977)). The change in the labour productivity
growth rate also aects inflation. On the contrary, the evolution of the nominal exchange rate
may be aected by other factors such as the interest rate dierence and political interventions
(Carlin and Soskice (2015)). As a result, the nominal exchange rate may not absorb countries’
inflation at each point in time. Taking these factors into consideration, the current model analyses
a case in which a price change has a strong eect on relative prices, which induces the dynamics
of BOPC growth.1
Lastly, I introduce the endogenous determination of the labour productivity growth rate and
employment rate. If labour productivity is constant over time, then labour demand growth is de-
termined by the BOPC growth rate, which most BOPC growth models suppose implicitly. These
dynamics run from the goods market to the labour market and there is no feedback from the latter
to the former. This is an analytically insucient setting in two senses. Firstly, if labour demand
growth is insucient to cover labour supply growth, the employment rate would be zero over
time, which is unrealistic. By contrast, if labour supply growth is insucient to cover labour
demand growth, then the economic growth rate is eventually determined by the natural growth
rate. Since the natural growth rate does not necessarily guarantee a balanced growth between
exports and imports, an economy will perpetually have an imbalance of payments, which is un-
1In fact, a body of the empirical literature advocates the importance of the eect of relative prices on BOPC
growth. On the basis of their empirical study, Bagnai et al. (2012) insist that the assumption of a constant real
exchange rate, routinely made in most studies, is inappropriate. Regarding the eect of relative prices, Soukiazis
et al. (2014) show that relative prices aect Italian growth, revealing that models without such prices under-predict
the actual growth rate. Soukiazis et al. (2013-2014) find that models with non-neutral relative prices predict the
growth rate better than does Thirlwall’s law, and thus relative prices are relevant in BOPC growth. Bahmani-Oskoee
(1995) reveals that PPP fails to hold for developing countries.
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sustainable. Secondly, labour productivity growth is a key determinant of price competitiveness
in international trade as well as labour demand. Therefore, the eect of productivity growth dy-
namics should not be assumed away, especially when one supposes that the commodity produced
in each country is a substitute and that the home country is in price competition with the foreign
country.2 For these reasons, by introducing the dynamic determination of labour productivity
growth, the current study analyses its impact on the BOPC growth rate and employment rate.
Taking these three analytical pillars into consideration, the current study contributes to the
body of knowledge by revealing the mechanisms of stable, unstable, and cyclical BOPC growth.
In particular, it adds new insights to previous findings on cyclical BOPC growth. Garcimartin
et al. (2016) capture the business cycle as the dierence in the short-run growth rates and the
growth rate determined by Thirlwall’s law (i.e. business cycles are merely the gap between these
two growth rates). However, the model used in this study is more dynamic than theirs in the
sense that it illustrates how the BOPC growth rate perpetually and endogenously deviates from
Thirlwall’s law. The current study shares inspirations from Goodwin (1967), Kalecki (1971),
Thirlwall (1979), and Da´vila-Ferna´ndez and Libaino (2016). However, the BOPC growth rate
in their models is always stable and constant at Thirlwall’s law. The current study, by contrast,
reveals that the BOPC growth rate may be cyclical or unstable. Moreover, I theoretically prove
the existence of cyclical BOPC growth and numerically depict the cyclical configuration. Similar
to Barbosa-Filho (2001) and Pugno (1998), the current study considers the dynamic adjustment
of the BOPC growth rate according to the trade imbalance over time. It further introduces the
conflictive wage/price distribution and dynamic adjustment of the employment rate, which dif-
ferentiates my model from that of Barbosa-Filho (2001) and Pugno (1998). Finally, the current
study sheds light on the potential instability hidden in the basic BOPC growth model when com-
bined with distributional and labour market dynamics.3
2This study exclusively focuses on the productivity eect on price competitiveness. The empirical evidence
suggests that a change in labour productivity also has a favourable impact on non-price competition (Romero and
MacCombie, 2017). However, this is beyond the scope of the current study.
3Since the current model is similar to that of Pugno (1998) in that both construct a dynamic model including the
income distribution and employment rate and generate cyclical behaviour in the BOPC growth model, it is better
to elaborate on the dierence in detail. His model contains autonomous demand, the export-import ratio, the real
exchange rate, as well as labour demand and supply. Although he simulates his model and shows cyclical behaviour,
the driving force behind these dynamics is unclear because of the inherent complexity. In addition, his proof of local
stability is insucient because it only explains a part (i.e. trace and determinant) of the Routh–Hurwitz stability
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the BOPC growth model
in which the BOPC growth rate, conflictive wage/price distribution, and employment rate are all
endogenously determined. Section 3 investigates the dynamic properties of the model. Section 4
numerically confirms the cyclical nature of the model analysed in the previous section. Section
5 is a comparative statics analysis of some of the parameters. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The main notations for the home country used in this study are as follows: YDt: total output
(total income), Lt: labour demand, Kt: capital stock, Nt: labour supply, qt: labour productivity,
pt: commodity price, wt: nominal wage rate, et: nominal exchange rate between two countries,
Xt: export demand, Mt: import demand, t: wage share, zt: employment rate. Variables with
t refer to time changes over time, but I omit the subscript t for parsimony. These notations are
employed to express the home country’s variables unless stated otherwise. The same variables in
the foreign country are expressed by adding the subscript F to the variable (e.g. the commodity
price in the foreign country is pF).
This study considers the international trade of commodities between the home country and
foreign country, focusing on the determinants of economic growth in the former. The firms in
both countries produce the same commodity, but at dierent prices. The commodity produced in
each country is a substitute and the home country is in price competition with the foreign country.
When the commodity price of the home country is higher than that of the foreign country, its
exports (imports) decrease (increase), and vice versa.
The firms in the home country operate with the following fixed coecient production function
using labour and capital:
YD = min(qL; unK);
meaning they are producing at a normal rate of capacity utilization un. I assume that the normal
rate of capacity utilization is constant over time. If labour and capital are eciently used in the
condition for higher-dimensional dierential equations. If one defines a five-dimensional dynamic model, it is
necessary to check the principle minor of the Jacobian matrix as well as the trace and determinant, which is not clear
in his study. Instead of his model, I straightforwardly focus on the dynamics of the BOPC growth rate, the income
distribution, and labour demand. As the model consists of three dimensions, it thus proves the local stability and
these dynamics are explained based on Marxian and Kaleckian concepts.
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home country, the output is produced by the following condition YD = unK = qL, of which the
dynamic expression is
ˆYD =
u˙n
un
+
˙K
K
=
q˙
q
+
˙L
L
; (1)
where the dot symbol means the derivative of the variable with regard to time (e.g. x˙ = dx=dt)
and the hat symbol means the growth rate of the variable (e.g. xˆ = x˙=x). Since the normal rate of
capacity utilization is constant, u˙n=un = 0, and the growth rates of capital stock and actual output
are the same. Capital accumulation is supposed to be accompanied by BOPC growth.
The export and import demand functions are formalized by using the following conventional
BOPC growth model. The demand functions for each commodity are given by the Cobb–Douglas
functional form. First, the export demand function for the commodity is given by
X = ¯X
 
epF
p
!"1
Y1F ; (2)
where ¯X is a constant term, "1 > 0 is the elasticity of relative prices, and 1 > 0 is the income
elasticity of demand for exports. This formalization means that if the real exchange rate de-
preciates (i.e. a rise in epF=p), the export demand of the home country’s commodity increases.
Equation (2) also means that booms in the foreign country (i.e. a rise in YF) induce higher export
demand for the home country’s commodity.
By taking the logarithms of equation (2) and dierentiating with respect to time, the growth
rate of exports is obtained as follows:
ˆX = "1(eˆ + pˆF   pˆ) + 1 ˆYF : (3)
This is the dynamic form of the export demand function.
Second, the import demand function for the foreign country’s commodity is given by
M = ¯M
 
epF
p
! "2
Y2D ; (4)
where ¯M is a constant term, "2 > 0 is the elasticity of relative prices, and 2 > 0 is the income
elasticity of demand for imports of the foreign commodity. When the real exchange rate depreci-
ates, the import demand of the foreign country’s commodity decreases. Equation (4) also means
that an increase in the home country’s income (i.e. a rise in YD) induces higher import demand
for the foreign country’s commodity.
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The dynamic form of the import demand function is derived by following the same procedure
as above. That yields
ˆM =  "2(eˆ + pˆF   pˆ) + 2 ˆYD: (5)
Jointly with "1 > 0 and "2 > 0, I assume that the Marshall–Lerner condition with respect to trade
holds. That is, "1 + "2 > 1, and exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) improves (deteriorates)
the trade balance.
The BOPC condition is measured in nominal terms at a macroeconomic level. If there is a
trade balance at the aggregate level at a point in time, it is given by
pX = pFeM;
where the left-hand side represents the total value of exports in the home country and the right-
hand side represents the total value of imports in the home country. As mentioned above, most
BOPC growth models assume that trade is initially balanced, and this balance is also kept over
time. This case is given as follows:
pˆ + ˆX = pˆF + eˆ + ˆM:
I now relax this assumption and introduce the case in which there are disequilibria of the balance
of payments. These disequilibria are then dynamically adjusted by the change in the economic
growth rate of the home country. That is, when nominal export demand grows faster (slower) than
nominal import demand, the growth rate of the home country increases (decreases) to recover the
balance of payments. Thus, the Keynesian quantitative adjustment rather than the neoclassical
price adjustment is supposed to restore the balance of payments (Blecker (1998)). By using
equations (3) and (5), an equation of motion for the growth rate of the home country is defined
by
˙
ˆYD =(pˆ + ˆX   pˆF   eˆ   ˆM)
=(pˆ + "F(eˆ + pˆF   pˆ) + 1 ˆYF   pˆF   eˆ + "2(eˆ + pˆF   pˆi)   2 ˆYD); (6)
where  denotes the speed of adjustment of the growth rate of the home country regarding the
disequilibria in the balance of payments.4
4This study does not explicitly incorporate the role of capital flows. Some BOPC growth models introduce
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When the trade balance is realized, the time rate of the change in exports and imports must
be equal. Therefore, ˙ˆYD = 0 is satisfied and I get
ˆYD =
1
2
ˆYF   
2
(eˆ + pˆF   pˆ); (7)
where   1 "1 "2. The sign of  is negative because the Marshall–Lerner condition "1+"2 > 1
has been imposed. The current study does not assume away the role of a change in relative prices
and considers its direct and indirect impacts on the BOPC growth rate.
By introducing the rate of change in the commodity price, the current study emphasizes the
dynamic chain of the conflictive wage/price distribution in the post-Keynesian literature (e.g.
Rowthorn (1977); Sasaki (2013); Lavoie (2014)). When introducing these dynamics into the
BOPC growth model, it is important that the real exchange rate does not evolve so that the
balance of payments can be realized at an ideal level; however, this change is aected by the
domestic distributive conflict. Thus, domestic conflicts (aspiration for target shares of the income
distribution) may cause international conflicts (disequilibrium in the balance of payments) and
vice versa.
The definition of the wage share is  = w=(pq), from which I obtain the dynamic expression
of the wage share as follows:
˙ = (wˆ   pˆ   qˆ): (8)
The conflictive wage/price distribution describes the dynamics of the money wage and price
in the following manner. Firms set their price to close the gap between their target profit share
and the actual profit share. If the actual profit share is lower than their target profit share, then
firms attempt to raise the growth rate of prices to realize the target share. By using the wage share
target, the dynamics of the price can be described as follows:
pˆ = (   C); (9)
capital flows according to trade imbalances and relax the external constraint for an economy during a certain period
(Thirlwall and Hussain (1982); Moreno-Brid (1998-99, 2003); Barbosa-Filho (2001)). However, the role of capital
flows is still controversial since their incorporation into the model may make little dierence to the predicted growth
rates and export growth is important (Thirlwall (2012)). In addition, capital inflows can be only a temporary way
of relaxing the BOPC model because they do not stimulate the export-led cumulative growth rate in the long run.
After all, economies cannot depend on capital flows to finance trade imbalances permanently, and the adjustment in
aggregate income eventually accommodates such imbalances. Hence, I analyse the basic BOPC growth model of
export and import dynamics with an aggregate income adjustment.
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where C > 0 is the target wage share set by firms, which I assume to be an exogenous variable
for simplicity.
The growth rate of the money wage that workers negotiate depends on the gap between their
target wage share and the actual wage share. If the actual wage share is lower than the target
wage share, workers attempt to raise the growth rate of wages to meet the target share. That is,
wˆ = (1   )(W(z)   ); W(z) > 0; 0w(z) > 0; (10)
where W(z) is the target wage share set by workers. I assume that W(z) > C for their target
wage share because firms and workers normally demand a higher profit share and a higher wage,
respectively. This is endogenously determined by the “reserve army eect.” This eect reflects
workers’ demands in the bargaining process, which change depending on their position in the
labour market. A high employment rate strengthens the position of workers to negotiate a higher
target wage share. In equations (9) and (10),  and 1    represent the relative bargaining power
of workers and firms across the income distribution, respectively, which also concern the speed
of the wage and price adjustment.5
The third state variable is the employment rate z. From the production function, I obtain
z = YD=qN, where N denotes the exogenous labour supply growing at the exogenously given
growth rate n. Hence, the change in the employment rate follows
z˙ = z( ˆYD   gq(z)   n); gq(z) > 0; g0q(z) > 0; (11)
where the reserve army creation eect g0q(z) > 0 is introduced into the labour productivity growth
dynamics. This eect stipulates that the growth rate of labour productivity depends positively
on the employment rate. Bhaduri (2006), Dutt (2006), and Sasaki (2013) introduce this eect
into their domestic models of growth and distribution, but I apply this eect to the BOPC growth
model. It is reasonable to simultaneously introduce this eect with the reserve army eect into
the current model for the following reason. The model focuses on the eect of relative price
changes on international trade. The upward pressure on the target wage share is one of the
determinants of the rise in the commodity price. As the labour market tightens via economic
5Sasaki et al. (2013)’s Kaleckian model considers the degree of price competition in wage bargaining and price
setting. Such a case may be appropriate to describe the corporatist economy in which labour and capital coorporate
to some extent. The background of the current study diers from theirs by illustrating the case in which internal and
external conflicts collude independently.
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growth, the bargaining power of workers increases because of the reserve army eect, which
exerts upward pressure on the target wage share. Without productivity growth, this aspiration
leads to a rise in the commodity price. The deterioration of price competitiveness consequently
leads to a decrease in net export growth under the Marshall–Lerner condition. To avoid the
deterioration of price competitiveness, firms try to introduce labour-saving technological progress
to maintain competitiveness. Hence, simultaneously introducing both eects is legitimate in the
current BOPC growth model with non-neutral price eects.
3 Analysis
The dynamic system of the BOPC growth model consists of three dierential equations. By
substituting the price equation (9) into equation (6), I obtain the dynamics of the output growth
rate ˙ˆYD. By substituting the price equation (9), wage dynamics (10), and productivity growth
equation (11) into equation (8), I obtain the dynamics of the wage share ˙. Finally, equation (11)
defines the dynamics of the employment rate z˙. Then, the system is summarized as follows:
˙
ˆYD = ((   C)   (eˆ + pˆF) + 1 ˆYF   2 ˆYD); (12)
˙ = ((1   )W(z) + C   gq(z)   ); (13)
z˙ = z( ˆYD   gq(z)   n): (14)
The steady state of the system occurs when ˙ˆYD = ˙ = z˙ = 0 is reached. In the following
analysis, it is assumed that there exist steady-state values such that  2 (0; 1), z 2 (0; 1), and
ˆYD > 0, where the asterisk represents the steady-state value. These values satisfy the following
equations:
ˆYD =
1
2
ˆYF +

2
(   C)   
2
(eˆ + pˆF); (15)
 = (1   )W(z) + C   gq(z); (16)
ˆYD = gq(z) + n: (17)
The standard BOPC growth model assumes PPP and a trade balance in the initial period as
well as over time. If I also assume eˆ = pˆ  pˆF , then I obtain ˆYD =
1
2
ˆYF . Hence, the above dynamic
system is reduced to a two-dimensional system composed of the wage share and employment
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rate. In this case, the BOPC growth rate follows Thirlwall’s law, and the steady state of the
two-dimensional subsystem is locally stable according to the Jacobian matrix defined below.
In the current model, however, when the Marshall–Lerner condition holds, the conflictive
wage/price distribution eectively intervenes in the dynamics of the BOPC growth rate. Then,
the growth rate feeds back to the dynamics of the employment rate (equation 14), which further
causes a change in the productivity growth rate and target wage share from the reserve army eect
and reserve army creation eect, respectively (equation 13). Accordingly, both the commodity
price and the nominal wage dynamically evolve further, which again gives feedback to the BOPC
growth rate through the wage share (equation 12). If the steady state is locally stable, the BOPC
growth rate is equal to the natural growth rate (equation 17). Because the growth rate of labour
productivity is endogenously determined in this three-dimensional model, the natural rate of
growth is also endogenous, which Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall (2002) empirically confirm.
To investigate the local asymptotic stability of the steady state, the system of dierential
equations (12), (13), and (14) is linearized around the steady state. The linearized system is
given by 0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
˙
ˆYD
˙
z˙
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
j11 j12 0
0 j22 j23
j31 0 j33
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA|            {z            }
J
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
ˆYD   ˆYD
   
z   z
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA ;
where J is the Jacobian matrix. The non-zero elements of the Jacobian matrix and their signs are
given as follows:
j11  @
˙
ˆYD
@ ˆYD
=  2 < 0;
j12  @
˙
ˆYD
@
=  < 0;
j22  @˙
@
=   < 0;
j23  @˙
@z
=  ? 0;
j31  @z˙
@ ˆYD
= z > 0;
j33  @z˙
@z
=  zg0q(z) < 0;
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where
  [(1   )0w(z)   g0q(z)] ? 0:
All the elements are evaluated at the steady-state values. Except for element j23, the signs of the
elements are unambiguous. Regarding the non-zero elements, the BOPC growth rate ( j11), wage
share ( j22), and employment rate ( j33) all have self-stable dynamics. Further, a rise in the wage
share lowers the BOPC growth rate ( j12) by deteriorating price competitiveness, and the rise in
the BOPC growth rate raises the employment rate ( j31).
The sign of j23 depends on two parts: the reserve army eect augmented by workers’ bar-
gaining power (1 )0w(z) and the reserve army creation eect g0q(z). Depending on the relative
strength of these two eects, the sign may be either positive or negative. The sign of j23 plays an
important role for both the stability of the equilibrium and the comparative statics analysis below.
I consider the dynamic properties of the model by examining the following two cases.
3.1 A stronger reserve army creation eect (Case A)
Let us consider the case in which the reserve army creation eect g0q(z) works stronger than the
reserve army eect augmented by workers’ bargaining power (1   )0w(z). In this case, I have
 < 0, and the sign of j23 is negative, meaning that a rise in the employment rate leads to an
increase in the profit share owing to the strong impact of the reserve army creation eect on the
labour productivity growth rate. Then, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the reserve army creation eect works stronger than the reserve
army eect augmented by workers’ bargaining power. If the Marshall–Lerner condition is sat-
isfied and  < 0, the steady state of the economy is locally stable when the income elasticity of
import demand 2 is suciently large; however, it is locally unstable when the income elasticity
of import demand 2 is suciently small.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
In the BOPC growth literature, 2 represents the income elasticity of import demand, which
is considered to reflect the non-price competitiveness of the foreign country’s commodity. A rise
in this value resulting from increasing the attractiveness of the imported goods, ceteris paribus
lowers the BOPC growth rate of the home country. This is also true for the current model (see also
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the comparative statics analysis). However, Proposition 1 indicates that a higher income elasticity
of import demand is required to establish stable BOPC growth when the wage share negatively
changes to a rise in the employment rate. This result implies that regarding the income elasticity
of import demand, a high BOPC growth rate and its stability may involve a trade-o.
3.2 A stronger reserve army eect (Case B)
Case B is when the reserve army eect augmented by workers’ bargaining power works stronger
than the reserve army creation eect. Formally,  > 0 and the sign of j23 is positive. This
means that a rise in the employment rate leads to a rise in the wage share. Hence, a rise in the
employment rate leads to a rise in the wage share because of the strong impact of the reserve
army eect on workers’ target wage share. Then, I obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the reserve army eect augmented by workers’ bargaining power
works stronger than the reserve army creation eect. If the Marshall–Lerner condition is satisfied
and suppose that the income elasticity of import demand is small. Then, a limit cycle occurs when
the speed of the adjustment of the goods market lies within a certain range.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The next section confirms the existence of cyclical BOPC growth by using a numerical study.
For instance, a rise in the BOPC growth rate leads to a rise in the employment rate. When
the reserve army eect works strongly, it induces a rise in the wage share and simultaneously
deteriorates price competitiveness. Consequently, the BOPC growth rate decreases, also leading
to a fall in employment. A fall in employment in turn induces a decline in the wage share
because of the strong reserve army eect and weak reserve army creation eect, improving price
competitiveness. Then, the BOPC growth rate increases again, leading to a rise in employment.
Thus, a new cycle begins, and the economy converges to a cyclical path.
However, once the feedback eect in this process is cut o, the long-run equilibrium becomes
stable. In this case, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 3. If the Marshall–Lerner condition is not satisfied in the sense of  = 0 or if the
conflictive wage/price distribution has a neutral eect on the commodity price from  = 0, the
steady state of the economy is locally stable.
12
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Comparing Propositions 1–3, both a strong reserve army creation eect (Case A) and a strong
reserve army eect (Case B) may have a destabilizing eect on the economy subject to balance-
of-payments constraints. Proposition 1 implies that a strong reserve army creation eect is a
cause of unstable dynamics when the income elasticity of import demand is low. Proposition
2 implies that a strong reserve army eect is a cause of perpetual fluctuation, combined with a
certain adjustment speed of the growth rate. Only when both eects are oset or the eect of the
exchange rate is neutral is the steady state necessarily stable (Proposition 3).
4 Numerical Study
This section employs numerical simulations and shows that the Hopf bifurcation exists when
a strong reserve army eect is working (Case B). The qualitative approach used here aims to
show how the BOPC growth model behaves cyclically, which Proposition 2 declares. The basic
parameters are set as follows:
1 = 0:775; 2 = 0:018; 1 = 0:775; 2 = 0:700; pˆ f = 0:0015; eˆ = 0:0015; ˆYF = 0:035;
 = 0:425; C = 0:500;  = 0:575;  = 0:950; q0 = 0:1000;  = 1:000; n = 0:015:
By using these parameters, the function of workers’ target profit share is defined as W(z) = z
and that of the productivity growth rate is gq(z) = q0z. In this numerical example, the parameters
are set so that the reserve army eect augmented by workers’ bargaining power works stronger
than the reserve army creation eect. In addition, the Marshall–Lerner condition is satisfied, and
the income elasticity of import demand is small. These ensure the preconditions for Proposition
2. To solve the dierential equation systems, the initial conditions for the BOPC growth rate,
wage share, and employment rate are ˆYD(0) = 0:05, (0) = 0:695, and z(0) = 0:75, respectively.
By using these parameters, the steady-state values of the endogenous variables are ˆYD =
0:079475,  = 0:658203, and z = 0:630027. In addition, there exist two Hopf bifurcation
points regarding the speed of the adjustment of the BOPC growth rate, which are 1 = 4:82401
and 2 = 25:7941. By using 1, the following figures present the dynamic behaviour of the main
variables.
Figure 1 presents the oscillation of the BOPC growth rate, wage share, and employment rate.
It shows that when an economy is trapped in this cycle, it never attains the economic growth rate
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Note: The red dotted line represents the BOPC growth rate, green solid line represents the wage share, and black
dashed line represents the employment rate.
Figure 1: Cyclical behaviour of the BOPC growth rate, wage share, and employment rate
that realizes the balance of payments. The BOPC growth rate reaches its peak (bottom) earlier
than the employment rate in this cycle, meaning employment is led by eective demand. On the
contrary, the BOPC growth rate moves in an opposite manner to the wage share, meaning that an
increase in the wage share deteriorates the price competitiveness of a country and consequently
restrains the BOPC growth rate.
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Figure 2: Anticlockwise cycles in the ( ˆYD, )-plane in Case B
Figures 2, 3, and 4 decompose the time series of the main variables into two dimensions.
Figure 2 projects the dynamics of the BOPC growth rate and wage share on the ( ˆYD, )-plane,
showing that the behaviour of the wage share and BOPC growth rate moves anticlockwise. Fig-
ure 3 presents the dynamics of the BOPC growth rate and employment rate on the (e, ˆYD)-plane.
The behaviour of the employment rate and BOPC growth rate moves clockwise. This figure also
confirms that the variation in the BOPC growth rate plays a leading role in determining the em-
ployment rate in the Keynesian fashion. Finally, Figure 4 projects the anticlockwise dynamics of
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Figure 3: Clockwise cycles in the (e, ˆYD)-plane in Case B
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Figure 4: Anticlockwise cycles in the (e, )-plane in Case B
the employment rate and wage share, which are similar to those of Goodwin (1967). Zipperer
and Skott (2011) and Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) report regular anticlockwise cycles in-
volving output (i.e. the capacity utilization rate) and the wage share in the US economy based
on the Goodwin-based model of the domestic economy. However, as Figures 2 and 4 show, if
the strong reserve army eect is combined with the BOPC model, anticlockwise cycles between
the growth rate and wage share can be reproduced as well. Therefore, the observed cycles can be
a form of what Stockhammer and Michell (2016) call the pseudo-Goodwin cycle, namely anti-
clockwise movements in the output–wage share space that are not completely due to the Goodwin
mechanism. The BOPC growth mechanism also generates similar cyclical growth.
5 Comparative Statics Analysis
This section investigates the eects of a shift in the parameters on the BOPC growth rate, wage
share, and employment rate for the stable case. Table 1 summarizes the results of the comparative
statics analysis in Cases A (stronger reserve army creation eect) and B (stronger reserve army
eect). The + sign indicates that the corresponding variable increases with a rise in the parameter,
while the   sign indicates that the corresponding variable decreases with it. Appendix B provides
the mathematical explanations.
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Table 1: Results of comparative statics analysis
Case A Case B
ˆYF 1 2 eˆ n W ˆYF 1 2 eˆ n W
ˆYD + +   +     + +   + +  
     +   + + + +   +   +
z + +   +     + +   +    
As in Thirlwall’s law, the BOPC growth rate ˆYD is positively led by a rise in the growth
rate of the foreign country ˆYF and a rise in the income elasticity of export demand 1, whereas
it is restrained by a rise in the income elasticity of import demand 2. An acceleration in the
depreciation rate of currency eˆ also has a positive impact on the BOPC growth rate. The impact
of these parameters on the employment rate is the same as the one for the BOPC growth rate.
This result explicitly shows that the employment rate is demand-led in the BOPC growth model.
These results hold in both Cases A and B.
The steady-state value of the wage share  is negatively related to ˆYF , 1, and eˆ, but positively
related to 2 in Case A. By contrast, it is positively related to ˆYF and 1, but eˆ is negatively related
to 2 in Case B. When the BOPC growth rate positively diverges from the initial steady state, it
increases the employment rate. This rise in the employment rate then stimulates the target wage
share of workers through the reserve army eect as well as stimulates the labour productivity
growth rate through the reserve army creation eect. If the latter is stronger than the former
(Case A), the wage share decreases; by contrast, if the former is stronger than the latter (Case B),
the wage share increases.
By introducing labour supply growth and the target wage share of workers into the current
BOPC growth model, the current model can evaluate these impacts. In Case A, when the em-
ployment rate falls short of the initial steady-state value by a rise in the labour supply growth rate
n, it strongly limits the productivity growth rate. Then, the actual wage share begins to rise and
the commodity price also rises, which deteriorates the price competitiveness of the home country.
Consequently, the BOPC growth rate and employment rate fall. In Case B, the same initial shock
reduces the employment rate, which in turn strongly restrains the target wage share of workers.
Accordingly, the actual wage share begins to fall, while the commodity price also falls. As a
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result, price competitiveness improves, which increases the BOPC growth rate and employment
rate.
The impact of an autonomous rise in the target wage shares of workers W decreases the
BOPC growth rate and employment rate, while it raises the equilibrium wage share in both cases.
A rise in workers’ target share provides strong momentum to the dynamics of the wage share,
which increases this value at the new steady state. At the same time, a rise in this share directly
deteriorates price competitiveness and restrains net export growth. Because of the decrease in net
export growth, the BOPC growth rate is lower than before. Consequently, the employment rate
also decreases.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a dynamic BOPC growth model incorporating a conflictive wage/price dis-
tribution and the endogenous determination of the labour productivity growth and employment
rates. Most BOPC growth models have exclusively focused on the stable equilibrium path, as-
suming away the causes and consequences of relative prices. However, the commodity price
in the home country may change through the bargaining process for the income distribution,
change in labour productivity growth, and accordingly the employment rate. In addition, the
adjustment process of the trade disequilibria in reality is not as immediate as the conventional
model supposes. Therefore, interactions among the BOPC growth rate, income distribution, and
employment rate may have a lasting eect on each other. By incorporating these ideas into the
BOPC growth model, the current study revealed the potentially unstable properties of this model.
If one ignores the role of relative prices by assuming PPP or assuming away the Marshall–
Lerner condition, the BOPC growth rate follows Thirlwall’s law in a stable manner. By contrast,
when a change in relative prices has a substantial impact on the trade balance, the steady state may
become unstable in certain conditions. First, if the reserve army creation eect works stronger
than the reserve army eect augmented by workers’ bargaining power, when the income elasticity
of import demand is low, the economy undergoes unstable dynamics. Although the lower income
elasticity of imports has been considered to be one of the sources of higher BOPC growth, it is
also a source of instability. Second, when the reserve army eect works stronger than the reserve
army creation eect, if the income elasticity of import demand is low and the speed of the growth
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rate adjustment for the disequilibria in the balance of payments lies within a certain range, then
limit cycles may occur. Thus, the lower income elasticity of imports is a source of cyclical
BOPC growth as well. Section 4 confirms this phenomenon by using a numerical simulation.
The anticlockwise cycles of the growth rate and employment rate for the wage share, which
some empirical research has also shown for the US economy, can be observed in the current
BOPC growth model.
This study also conducted a comparative statics analysis. A rise in the foreign growth rate
and income elasticity of exports as well as the depreciation of the exchange rate or fall in that
of imports raise the BOPC growth rate and employment rate. However, these impacts on the
wage share dier according to the relative strength of the reserve army eect and reserve army
creation eect. By introducing the labour supply growth rate and endogenizing the wage share,
it was also revealed that rises in the labour supply growth rate and workers’ target wage share
also decrease the BOPC growth rate and employment rate in both cases. As for their impacts on
the wage share, the impact of a rise in the labour supply growth rate diers from case to case,
whereas an autonomous rise in workers’ target wage share necessarily increases the wage share
in both cases.
The conventional BOPC growth model arrives in most cases at Thirlwall’s law, in which the
BOPC growth rate remains constant. This law is independent of the income distribution and
employment. By contrast, the extension in this study reveals the causes and consequences of
the employment and income distribution dynamics within the BOPC growth framework. Once
we introduce into the model the core of post-Keynesian economics, namely that the income
distribution matters and the employment rate is led by eective demand, substantial implications
ensue.
Appendix A: Local stability of the steady state
To prove Propositions 1, 2, and 3, let us state a preliminary argument. The characteristic equation
that corresponds to the Jacobian matrix J is given as
3 + a1
2 + a2 + a3 = 0;
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where  denotes a characteristic root. Coecients a1; a2, and a3 are given by
a1 =  trJ =  ( j11 + j22 + j33);
a2 =
 j11 j120 j22
 +
 j22 j230 j33
 +
 j11 0j31 j33
 = j11 j22 + j22 j33 + j11 j33;
a3 =   det J =  ( j11 j22 j33 + j12 j23 j31);
where tr J denotes the trace of J, a2 is the sum of the principal minors’ determinants, and
a3 = det J is the determinant of J.
The necessary and sucient condition for local stability is that all the characteristic roots
of the Jacobian matrix have negative real parts, which, from the Routh–Hurwitz condition, is
equivalent to
a1 > 0; a2 > 0; a3 > 0; a1a2   a3 > 0:
I investigate whether these conditions are satisfied. The current model has the property that
the coecients of the characteristic equation are linear functions of the adjustment speed  for
the disequilibrium in the balance of payments. These coecients are
a1  1 + 2;
a2  3 + 4;
a3  5;
a1a2   a3  f () = (13)2 + (14 + 23   5) + 24;
where 1 to 5 and their signs are as follows:
1  2 > 0;
2   + zg0q(z) > 0;
3  2( + zg0q(z)) > 0;
4  zg0q(z) > 0;
5  z(2g0q(z)   ) ? 0:
Since the signs of 1;2;3, and 4 are uniquely positive, a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 are satisfied for
positive values of . In addition, f () is a convex downwards and its intercept is positive. The
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axis of this is given by
¯ =
 (14 + 23   5)
213
;
where the denominator is positive. When the interception of f () is positive, as long as its axis
is located in  < 0, f () > 0 is necessarily satisfied for  > 0, and the sign of a1a2   a3 is also
positive. However, when the value of 5 is positive and large, the axis of the function on the
graph may be located in  > 0, and the graph of the function may cross the horizontal axis in the
positive domain.
Thus, the conditions a3 > 0 and a1a2   a3 > 0 are concerned with the sign of 5. Therefore,
it is necessary to check the stability conditions with these two terms altogether.
Proof of Proposition 1. As proven above, a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 are always satisfied. When the
reserve army creation eect is stronger (Case A),  < 0. Then, let us focus on a3 and the
coecient of 14 + 23   5 that determines the axis of parabola f (). By expanding this
coecient, I have
14 + 23   5 = 2( + zg0q(z))2 + z;
where  is negative and  is also negative from the Marshall–Lerner condition. Hence, f () > 0
is always satisfied for  > 0, meaning a1a2   a3 > 0.
On the contrary, a3 is
a3 = 
z(2g0q(z)   );
in which both  and  are negative from the strong reserve army creation eect and Marshall–
Lerner condition, respectively. For a3 to be positive, I need
2 >

g0q(z)
;
meaning that if 2 is suciently large, it ensures a3 > 0, and that if 2 is suciently small, it
does not ensure a3 > 0. Therefore, as long as 2 is suciently large (small), the necessary and
sucient conditions for local stability are all satisfied (not satisfied). 
Proof of Proposition 2. In the case of a stronger reserve army eect augmented by workers’ bar-
gaining power, I have  > 0. In addition to a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, it is always satisfied that
a3 = 
z(2g0q(z)   ) > 0;
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where  is negative and  is negative from the Marshall–Lerner condition.
On the contrary, a coecient of f () that determines the position of the axis of the parabola
is
14 + 23   5 = 2( + zg0q(z))2 + z:
If the following inequality is satisfied
2( + zg0q(z))2 <  z;
then the axis of parabola ¯ comes to  > 0. This is true when the income elasticity of import
demand 2 is small, while the Marshall–Lerner condition works strongly (i.e. a large absolute
value of ). In this case, the discriminant of f () = 0 is positive, and the equation f () has two
positive real roots, on which the sign of f () alternates. That is, for  2 (0; 1), a1 > 0, a2 > 0,
a3 > 0, and a1a2   a3 > 0 are all satisfied; for  2 (1; 2), a1 > 0, a2 > 0, a3 > 0 are satisfied,
but a1a2   a3 < 0; for  > 2, a1 > 0, a2 > 0, a3 > 0, and a1a2   a3 > 0 are all satisfied again.
Therefore, the limit cycle occurs by the Hopf bifurcation at  = 1 and  = 2. Indeed, at
 = 1 and  = 2, I get
a1 > 0; a2 > 0; a3 > 0;
@(a1a2   a3)
@

=1or 2
, 0;
which means that all the conditions for the Hopf bifurcation are satisfied. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Again, a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 are always satisfied. Let us first impose  = 0
in the dynamic system. Then, I obtain a3  z2g0q(z) > 0. In addition, 14 + 23   5
determining the position of parabola f () is
14 + 23   5 = 2( + zg0q(z))2 > 0:
Therefore, the axis of this parabola is always located in  < 0 in this case. Hence, a1a2   a3 > 0
is necessarily satisfied for  > 0.
Second, let us consider the case in which the reserve army eect and reserve army creation
eect oset each other and  = 0. Since the rate of change in the commodity price at the steady
state is pˆ = [(1   )W(z)   gq(z)], if these eects oset each other, the impact on the rate of
change in the commodity price is neutral. In this case, it is satisfied that a3  z2g0q(z) > 0.
In addition, 14 + 23   5 that determines the position of parabola f () is
14 + 23   5 = 2( + zg0q(z))2 > 0:
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Therefore, the axis of this parabola is always located in  < 0 in this case, too. Similar to the first
case, a1a2   a3 > 0 is necessarily satisfied for  > 0. 
Appendix B: Comparative Statics Analysis
The steady-state values of the BOPC growth rate, wage share, and employment rate satisfy equa-
tions (15), (16), and (17). The comparative statics analysis is conducted in the stable case. When
the equilibrium of the system is locally stable, the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative.
Therefore, the sign of the following value
  2g0q(z)   
used in the comparative statics analysis is positive. Then, the impact of a change in the following
parameters on the steady-state values is as follows:
 The impact of a change in the growth rate of the foreign country
d ˆYD
d ˆYF
= 1g
0
q(z) > 0;
d
d ˆYF
= 1 ? 0;
dz
d ˆYF
= 1 > 0:
In Case A where  < 0, I obtain d=d ˆYF < 0, while in Case B where  > 0, I obtain
d=d ˆYF > 0.
 The impact of a change in the income elasticity of exports (1)
d ˆYD
d1
=  ˆYFg0q(z) > 0;
d
d1
=  ˆYF ? 0;
dz
d1
=  ˆYF > 0:
In Case A where  < 0, I obtain d=d1 < 0, while in Case B where  > 0, I obtain
d=d1 > 0.
22
 The impact of a change in the income elasticity of imports (2)
d ˆYD
d2
=   ˆYDg0q(z) < 0;
d
d2
=   ˆYD ? 0;
dz
d2
=   ˆYD < 0:
In Case A where  < 0, I obtain d=d2 > 0, while in Case B where  > 0, I obtain
d=d2 < 0.
 The impact of a change in the nominal exchange rate (eˆ)
d ˆYD
deˆ =  g
0
q(z) > 0;
d
deˆ =   ? 0;
dz
deˆ =   > 0:
In Case A where  < 0, I obtain d=deˆ < 0, while in Case B where  > 0, I obtain
d=deˆ > 0.
 The impact of a change in the labour supply growth rate (n)
d ˆYD
dn =   ? 0;
d
dn =  2 ? 0;
dz
dn =  2 < 0:
In Case A where  < 0, I obtain d ˆYD=dn < 0 and d=dn > 0, while in Case B where
 > 0, I obtain d ˆYD=dn > 0 and d=dn < 0.
 The impact of an autonomous change in workers’ target wage share (W)
d ˆYD
dW
= g0q(z)(1   )0w(z) < 0;
d
dW
= 2(1   )0w(z)g0q(z) > 0;
dz
dW
= (1   )0w(z) < 0:
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